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ABSTRACT   
Studies of the commons grew out of responses to Hardin's bleak prediction 
of “tragedy of the commons,” that without state intervention or 
privatization, any commons will eventually be destroyed by allegedly self-
interested users. As such, the commons studies traditionally tend to 
demonstrate cases where common pool resources (CPR) can be sustainably 
managed by groups of people beyond the state and market interventions. 
This paper shows a case from Sulawesi, Indonesia, where a state social 
forestry program can create a space for the program beneficiaries to build a 
commons. Through fieldwork that involves participant observation and in-
depth interviews with program extension workers and beneficiaries in two 
social forestry farmer groups, this study found that the program can 
stimulate beneficiary groups to build collective action in managing the 
state forest plots admitted to them and that the two groups are the only 
successful ones among 14 neighboring groups that are involved in the 
same program. The study also shows that the management of the state-
sponsored commons requires extension workers with deep knowledge 
about local people and landscape, economic incentives, and the flexibility 
of the local state agency in bending the rules based on bottom-up 
demands. Therefore, the case study shows that, on the one hand, the state 
program can actually stimulate the creation of the commons. On the other 
hand, commoning seems to be the only way to ensure a successful social 
forestry program.      
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Studies of the commons grew out of responses to Hardin's bleak prediction of 
“Tragedy of the commons,” that without state intervention or privatization, any 
commons will eventually be destroyed by allegedly self-interested users (Hardin, 
1968). The leading proponents of the studies of the commons provide enormous 
instances from all over the globe on the ability of the resource users to get together 
and develop institutions to successfully manage their commonly held resource, the 
commons. Based on a multitude of case studies, Elinor Ostrom (1990) abstracted a list 
of primary conditions under which the collective users would be able to maintain the 
common pool resources (CPR) while enjoying sustainable benefits, namely the “design 
principles.”   
As a response to Hardin’s prediction and solutions, the commons studies 
traditionally tend to demonstrate cases where commons can be sustainably managed 
by groups of people beyond the state and market interventions (Nayak & Berkes, 
2021). In addition, since Ostrom's CPR theory of commons divides the types of goods 
into public, private, and common goods, there is a tendency to neglect the private and 
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public goods, or the hybrid types of goods as a site where commons can thrive (Turner, 
2017). It is in this light that some current studies began to turn to the concept of 
‘commoning’, which instead of focusing on the goods, or the property regimes, they 
pay more attention to a social practice that creates collective actions and institutions 
to manage a resource collectively regardless the type of goods they are governing 
(Bollier & Helfrich, 2015; Euler, 2018; Fournier, 2013; Turner, 2017). By turning on 
another spotlight toward the commoning practices, instead of merely showing how 
common goods are managed, studies can begin to examine the roles of the state in the 
practice of commoning. Ryan (2013), for instance, began to specifically point out the 
ways in which the state can support and promote the common practices.      
Nonetheless, through multitudes of case studies, Ostrom’s theory of successful 
commons (Ostrom, 1990) is too robust to be abandoned. It is solid in identifying why a 
specific commons can be considered successful, understood here as those that bring 
sustainable benefits to the users while conserving the commonly held resources 
contingent to contemporary institutions, infrastructure, and natural resource 
conditions (Baggio et al., 2016). Ostrom’s eight design principles can show us to 
determine whether a commons is successful or not. While retaining the principles to 
examine the case, this study will consider the challenges put forward by previous 
studies around power relations, cultural contexts, heterogeneity of rationalities 
underpinning the choice made by involved actors choice (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015; 
Mosse, 2006; Mudliar & Koontz, 2021; Saunders, 2014; Singleton, 2017). In other 
words, the principle designs will be unpacked with a critical institutionalism approach 
(Cleaver & de Koning, 2015; Jones, 2015). Focusing on an Indonesian national 
government program, a Social Forestry (SF) scheme called ‘community forestry’ 
(Hutan Kemasyarakatan, HKm) in South Sulawesi province, this study will apply 
design principles and the critical institutionalism lens to look at the commons 
managed by the groups of farmers involved in the scheme.  
Formal SF in Indonesia has undergone three distinct generations (Sahide et al., 
2020), similar to the categorization of the formal period of SF identified by Fisher et al. 
(2019). The first generation of Indonesian SF during the authoritarian New Order rule 
explains the limited micro-scale and project-level SF engagements during this period. 
Meanwhile, the second generation grew out of political opportunities after the fall of 
the New Order government toward the end of the 1990s, which strengthened the 
national and international campaigns for more participation in forestry management. 
In the early stage, the second-generation SF was basically trial initiatives for future SF 
implementation that would help guide the regulatory processes, and therefore 
experienced funding provisions, field activities, and formation of farmer groups. 
However, while they are characterized by planting activities and promise for future 
income, studies described them as “tokenistic and procedural” while lacking material 
benefit-sharing (Fisher et al., 2019). They are pilot projects that are carried out to 
initiate longer-term state SF programming and were not pursued to devolve decision-
making on land management. The third generation saw the rapid expansion of SF 
implementation, the development of new SF schemes and regulatory structure, 
especially since the first period of Joko Widodo's presidency (2014-2019).  The SF 
areas have more than doubled up to 2 million hectares and continue to expand to 
reach the target of 12.7 million hectares to be granted rights for communities. 
However, this generation of SF again witnessed an “overwhelming focus on issuing 
permits” rather than the actual field implementation (Fisher et al., 2019). 
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The study aims to examine how the SF program redistributes plots of state 
forestland, which opens an opportunity to groups of farmers to manage the resource 
collectively, and how they make use of the opportunities and go through multiple 
complexities to subsequently create commons through the practice of commoning.   
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
CPR design principles explain the necessary conditions that characterize the 
likelihood of CPR management being long-enduring (Baggio et al., 2016; Ostrom, 
1990). Subsequent studies to implement, enrich, and revise the design principles in 
various aspects. Studies have revealed, for instance, the missing question of power 
within the design principles (Mudliar & Koontz, 2021); lack of examination of multiple 
rationalities underpinning the collective choice to govern the commons (Singleton, 
2017); and embeddedness of the actors within various institutions and networks 
across different level often with different norms and interest, and therefore defy the 
view of homogeneity within communities of resource users (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; 
Cleaver & de Koning, 2015). (Saunders, 2014) concludes that the CPR theory tends to 
be detached from the context since it explains the institutions governing the CPR 
more through actors involved in voluntary exchanges through mutual agreement and 
expect shared benefits than those in conflictual and unequal power relationships. 
This study acknowledges the deep tension between “the assertion that 
sustainable resource-managing communities have existed since eternity (thus proving 
their effectiveness and viability), and the idea that communities or groups need to be 
created, their social capital developed and institutions crafted by outside stimulation 
and investment by the State or NGOs” (Saunders, 2014). However, we apply the 
principal design here as a way to analyze the extent to which the commons are 
healthy while considering its embeddedness in power relations, local norms, and the 
plurality of rationality (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015). 
In other words, while unpacking the design principles, this study adopts a 
‘critical institutionalism’ approach (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015) which explores several 
complexities around the commons. First, this study takes into account socio-historical 
and broader structural contexts of the commons. This research understands that a 
common can extend from local to the global system (Chikozho & Mapedza, 2017; 
Jones, 2015; Saunders, 2014). Second, we recognize the interplay between formal and 
informal, traditional and modern arrangements. A commons can be managed outside 
of the state and private sphere, although it is open to state intervention to some 
extent (Bollier, 2014), or public goods typically managed by states (Harvey, 2011; 
Shaw, 2014). Third, the study considers the institutional complexities embedded in 
daily social life: as resource users/managers are socially embedded, this study delves 
into norms, values, and interests of different actors at different levels (Cleaver & de 
Koning, 2015). Fourth, the resulting power relations can show internal exclusion 
within the proprietor groups themselves, which may or may not include users, since a 
commons is not always inclusive and progressive but can also be regressive and 
exclusive (Bakker, 2007). This study will not assume homogeneity within communities 
and pay attention to ‘democratic political space’ for the most marginalized group in 
decision making (Shaw, 2014). As Mosse (2006) argues, collective action can also be 
supported by ranked social relations and link to wider state bureaucracy levels that 
legitimize local authority and allocate productive resources. In this case, collective 
action can be successful while “embedded in wider systems of patronage and 
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“corruption,” as well as in village social hierarchies.” (Mosse, 2006: 702). 
In addition, considering the tension between long existed and newly built 
commons (Saunders, 2014), instead of applying the principles to analyze a traditional 
type of resource users, we delve into in situ institutional conditions developed in a 
deliberate social forestry program. Examining a newly built institution sponsored by 
an outside state program and NGO project, bringing in new types of rules and 
arrangement, and located within a state forest, would sit awkwardly with typical 
studies of the commons. It is true, at least for three reasons. First, traditional 
commons studies tend to examine long-standing commons governance developed by 
traditional resource user communities (Saunders, 2014). Second, by virtue of Ostrom’s 
classification of goods--public, private, commons, club (Ostrom, 1990), the study of 
the commons put more focus on the common goods than the others and hybrid types 
of goods (Saunders, 2014). Third, based on the same classification of goods, commons 
studies focused more on the goods than the social practices that created the 
commons, the commoning (Euler, 2018).  
Commoning is understood here as social practices that involve voluntary and 
inclusive self-organization and mediations in order to meet shared needs (Euler, 
2018). Studies on commoning (or commonisation, see Nayak & Berkes (2021)) 
emphasize the processes through which a group of people comes together to manage 
commonly-held resources to achieve shared objectives (Fisher & Nading, 2020; 
Fournier, 2013; Sandström et al., 2017). As a collective social practice, the 
commoning includes co-produce rules that provide local services to face constraints, 
contribute voluntarily to satisfy shared needs, and create self-governing institutions 
where members directly affect each decision making (Euler, 2018). This shifts of focus 
from the goods toward the social practices in managing collective affairs, including 
the goods, also allow studying the commons governance in any type of property 
regime governing the commonly held resources. Moreover, (Nayak & Berkes, 2021) 
pointed out an increasing number of hybrid types of goods with mixed property 
regimes managed by different groups of people as their shared resources. With this in 
mind, we propose adding studies on the commons that look at the public goods, in this 
case, to study the Indonesian government social forestry program in a state forest.   
This case study focuses on two community forestry (HKm) groups in the Village 
of Mattirotasi (see Figure 1). The village is located on a stretch of 3,400 ha, on what 
used to be barren low hills in the province of South Sulawesi. The community forestry 
scheme has come to the village since 1999, first as a trial managed by Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), a donor organization based in Japan. The 
Regional Watershed Management Unit (Balai Pengelola Daerah Aliran Sungai, here on 
BPDAS) then continued the trial project since 2002. Moreover, in 2012, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry granted formal use rights under a social forestry scheme of 
‘Community Forestry’ (Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hutan Kemasyarakatan, IUPHKm) by 
issuing the ministerial decree (SK Menteri) to 14 HKm farmer groups (Kelompok Tani 
Hutan) in the village. The two groups presented in this case study are Mattirowalie and 
Sipatuo 2. Mattirowalie currently has 28 members, and Sipatuo 2 is managed by 35 
members. Despite the formal grouping, in reality, the two groups act as one, as the 
extension agent works for both groups (more below). 
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Figure 1. Map of HKm Mattirotasi 
3. METHODS 
We conducted participant observation, as the first author is an officer in KPH 
Bila who has served the office since 2019. Interviews and FGDs are carried out with 
the group members, village officials, and extension staff from July to October 2020. 
The collaborative fieldwork ensures that the first author's possible biases as a local 
forestry officer are revealed. The authors are fluent in local (i.e., Bugis) language, 
which helps build relaxed interviews and observation, probing, and understanding 
casual conversation. 
Paraphrasing the design principles following this case study, these principles 
include (1) clearly defined forest and members boundaries, (2) congruence between 
local conditions and rules and between costs and benefits, (3) participation of group 
members in making and modifying rules, (4) The group rules are acknowledged and 
respected by higher authorities (5) develop own monitoring and accountability 
systems, (6) Graduated sanctions, (7) Affordable conflict-resolution mechanisms, and 
(8) Nested enterprise (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990). 
To fill the gaps in the design principles discussed above, following the Critical 
Institutional Analysis (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015), we examine the broader context 
and historical formation of institutional arrangements currently governing commons. 
These include (i) the types of rules and relationships developed within and between 
actors operating at various scales, which includes ‘institutional bricolage,’ an ability of 
an institution to adopt new aspects and modify itself to serve as a multipurpose 
institution, (ii) interactions of norms, values, and interests among actors involved, (iii) 
the resulting power relation driving collective action among resilient communities 
(Cleaver & de Koning, 2015). Exploration into these aspects establishes the necessary 
background that supports exploring the current forms of commons governance. 
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In the next section, we will present a brief recent history of Mattirotasi 
commons, beginning with the start of a social forestry project in 1999, and on 
occasions reflecting on earlier situations to understand the background for the 
commons institutional arrangement. We will then examine the forest commons 
managed by the two HKm groups using the principle design while discussing multi-
level relationships, norms, and values involved, as well as interests and power 
relations. We then conclude that the success of the Mattirotasi forest commons 
depends on several factors: the substantial economic benefits from the forest plots, 
mutually impactful interaction between the program and the local commoning, and 
the ability to build complex relations with the state, especially by a mediator, the 
extension staff who is also a group member 
4. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MATTIROTASI COMMONS 
The rise of the HKm groups in Mattirotasi characterizes the transition between 
SF's first and second generations. On the one hand, the SF was conducted as a 
community forestry project with the potential of formal follow-up programming by the 
state forestry agency. Here, the SF was initiated as a ‘pilot project,’ ran from 1999 to 
2000, covers 1000 ha of state forest, and is managed by the OECF). The project 
provided seeds and funds for the tree planting and the subsequent maintenance (run 
by a private company). The end result would be evaluated by a state agency (BPDAS 
Jeneberang-Walanae). While the local people granted plots of land within the program 
territory (state forest), they view the project as an important job opportunity that 
provides wages for their labor to plant the seeds and maintain the new trees. In 
addition, as one of the project's requirements, the local residents need to gather 
themselves in community forestry groups (Kelompok HKm) to participate in the 
project. During the project implementation, the community groups were accompanied 
by an NGO and university staff. The project involved 500 families from three districts 
(Sidrap, Parepare, and Pinrang) adjacent to the forest area, divided into 20 HKm 
groups.  
Predominantly oriented toward conservation, the project assigns a composition 
of 70% timber trees and 30% of multipurpose tree species (mpts) to cover the HKm 
area. The HKm group planted timber trees such as local teak (Tectona grandis L.f.),  
Gmelina arborea Roxb, Swietenia mahagoni (L.) Jacq, Calliandra calothyrsus, 
Leucaena leucocephala; and mpts including cashew nuts, candlenuts, and mangoes. 
The conservation emphasis is also seen in the forest area chosen for the project. It was 
a marginal land dominated by savanna where cows are herded to graze. In fact, prior 
to the project, part of the area was controlled by private farms for cow production 
owned by local and national elites. Burning was also regularly seen in the area as the 
local people used the practice for varied purposes: slash and burn to clear croplands, 
heating the ground surface to ease the rocks digging to produce gravel, and chasing 
wild boar away from their croplands.  
Prior to the OECF project, the local people considered the state forest area as 
croplands and grazing areas, and the monitoring was not so robust that it could crowd 
the people out of the land. The project then signified the start of the enclosure of the 
area: it sponsored the tree planting, which stimulated a multiyear program by BPDAS 
to nurture the trees, resulting in many parts of the forest being thickly covered with 
tree stands, so much so that the base can no longer be cultivated. At the completion of 
the OECF project in 2001, BPDAS Jeneberang-Walanae took over by first conducting 
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an evaluation of the project's planting results, who then recommended that the trees 
are ‘feasible to be maintained’ in the next year's budget. Following the 
recommendation, the BPDAS conducted a multi-year program to take care of the 
planted trees from 2002 to 2005 and replace dead trees in 2006 and 2007. 
The enclosure met with little resistance from the local people as they 
participated in the manual work of planting trees for a small weekly payment while 
enclosing their own grazing and cultivation lands. The local people see the planting as 
a wage labor project, and the resistance only arises when they ask for wage raises, 
and when their demand was neglected, around half of the group members went on 
strike. They simply stopped planting. There was little sense that they would receive 
any benefit from the trees they had planted.  
In this context, an extension worker of the BPDAS project employed a different 
approach that stimulated better participation of the local people. He started work 
during the BPDAS project, a trial to community forestry management (uji coba HKm), 
and was responsible for technical assistance for four HKm groups granted the Block 1 
of the forest area under experiment. His efforts proved to be stimulating the group to 
participate in the aborted planting process, and in doing so, he created a new meaning 
of the community forestry project to the local people. In doing so, he initiated the 
commoning process. To be able to do so, however, he had to negotiate and bend some 
rules.   
The scheme regulated that the forest should compose 70% of timber trees and 
30% of multipurpose tree species (mpts). This ratio failed to attract the local people to 
end their strikes. The extension worker faced a challenging problem when trying to 
convince the group members of the future ecological and economic benefits of tree 
planting and tending. The people expressed that they could not see any benefit in 
participating in the project. Recalling their collective memories, they doubt that the 
trees would bring economic benefit. “Our parents did not give us seeds and all sorts of 
agricultural tools, nor did they pay us to plant trees. If that is the way, the harvest 
certainly will not be for us.” The stories of people who are put behind bars for cutting 
trees they planted in the forest are widespread; or the stories of those who planted 
trees under government projects in their lands, by the forest, only to find several years 
later that they are no longer allowed to cut the trees. They were doubtful by the 
possibility that the government would actually grant them the forest for them to 
control.  
Against this obstacle, the extension worker asked for a 2 ha plot from one of the 
group members, which was relatively easy since the member had little interest in the 
plot anyway. Weeding the land to prepare for the planting, he shows the local people 
that he will plant trees and harvest the produce and that they could do the same. He 
violated the rule that directed only group members to work on the land, but upon 
seeing his activity, the group member began to wonder whether the state had granted 
the land for them. He did not see any other way to convince the HKm group members 
to participate. When a few group members follow his example, clearing their plot to 
plant trees, they see him as a kind of insurance: “If the government will fool us. they 
would first have to fool their staff.” 
This dubious act of the government staff, and the people’s reaction to it, 
demonstrate the complexity in the government day to day mechanisms that at times 
extend to illegal but seen to be licit activities (van Schendel & Abraham, 2005). These 
practices are usually governed by certain types of informal institutions that require 
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compliance from their participants, including those in formal offices (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2004). On paper, his action is illegal, but as it was usual for the people to see 
government staff own or use legally banned lands without consequences, their 
understanding was that the government staff action was legal, or at least it would be 
well protected or have certain legitimation in his local office (on varied state illegal 
but licit actions, see Aspinall & van Klinken (2011) and Peluso (1992)). This HKm 
group members' understanding of such licit action seems to be stronger, in this case, 
it can convince them that the government staff action will ensure that the government 
would not invade their future harvest on their legally granted plots. 
However, this action only solved one source of participation problem for the 
group members, that the government would not violate their grants. Another problem 
was to convince the group members that the economic return would justify their 
effort. This translates into the type of trees they will be able to plant in Block 1. As 
noted above, the BPDAS program required the composition of 70% timber trees and 
30% mpts. The extension worker had to negotiate with his superior at the BPDAS 
office to provide tree seeds in reverse order: 70% mpts and 30% timber trees. It would 
once again violate the rule, but he had two strong arguments to make. First, seen in 
total, the actually planted trees in the three blocks during the previous OECF project 
show a lopsided proportion of 80% timber trees compared to 20% mpts. Therefore, 
reversing the composition only in Block 1, which is the smallest among the three 
Blocks, would not reverse the composition of the entire area under the BPDAS project. 
Second, the group members would not participate in the project without inverting the 
ratio, which would result in the project's failure. With such arguments and considering 
that the trial social forestry program was a showcase that could not be failed (Fisher 
et al., 2019), the superior agreed.  The farmer members then mainly planted cashew 
on their own plots (more below), and today they produce approximately 700 tonnes of 
cashew nuts annually. 
The second generation of social forestry is characterized by the shift from 
rehabilitation regime to the distribution of access rights (Fisher et al., 2019). In this 
case, the community forestry program distributes use rights for the people to access 
the state forest for 35 years. Out of the 1000 ha of the state forest involved in the 
previous rehabilitation pilot project area, only 750 ha was distributed to 14 HKm 
groups. The definitive HKm groups were established in 2012 as a requirement for the 
rights distribution. The state forest distributed to them is legally classified as 
production forest (Hutan Produksi Terbatas), meaning they can actually harvest trees 
in the forest. However, experience and collective memory have taught them that 
cutting trees in state forests frequently requires complex procedures, even when one 
cut trees he planted. The farmer group managing HKm Sipatuo 2 received 45,25 ha, 
while the farmer group of Hkm Mattirowalie granted 39,3 ha. 
In 2014 the group members began to breed livestock in the HKm area. It began 
when a few members noticed mutual symbiosis between the livestock and cashew 
trees. They found out that during dry seasons, when the grass volume typically 
reduced, the cows grazing in the area showed no sign of a decrease in size. It turns out 
that the cows consume the fruits that are attached to the cashew nuts (the locals call 
them “failed nuts”). In return, the trees seem to become more fertile as they receive a 
steady supply of manure from the cattle. After some meetings, they decided to collect 
money to gradually build a fence surrounding the whole groups’ area for cow 
breeding. They set an annual contribution from each member (more below), buy barb 
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wires, and work collectively to plant posts and extend the barb wires. The fence 
effectively keeps the cows in and animal intruders out and helps to keep their cashew 
harvest intact. They recently added a fodder barn inside the area to tap with increasing 
fodder needs. Last year approximately 200 cows were roaming inside the area, and 
there were signs that the area could no longer feed the population, so members took 
out part of their cows to reduce the stress. Today there are around 160 cows kept in 
the group's HKm area.     
5. DESIGN PRINCIPLES IN A COMMUNITY FORESTRY PROGRAM  
5.1. Clear membership and plot boundaries  
While the land boundary was set since it was formally established as the HKm 
area before the OECF trial project, the membership boundary went through dynamics 
of membership changes. During the OECF programs, most of the original and recorded 
members of the HKm groups did not have an interest in managing their assigned plots 
and decided to neglect them. It was still the case at the termination of the project. As 
mentioned above, there are two reasons for the lack of farmers' interest: they did not 
believe that the government would keep their promise to let them cultivate the land, 
and some of the lands were covered with thick timber trees that defy any cultivation 
under the canopy.  Learning from this past experience, in order to attract new 
members and to provide a sense of security that their future HKm plots would not be 
reclaimed by the government and the absentee members, the group develop an 
internal rule that new members who neglect their plots after six months will be 
replaced by yet the new one who are willing to obey the rule, by preparing and 
planting on their land as soon as possible. Since 2010, these dynamics began to settle 
for two reasons: financial gains and formal issue of the HKm grants. The proof of 
financial gains from the cashew nuts and cow breeding also explains the stability of 
membership since before formal signing of the groups. Since around 2010, most of the 
cashew trees have matured and the harvest brings a substantial amount of income to 
the members. This way the members are strongly motivated to maintain their rights for 
obvious reasons. The issue of the ministerial decree in 2012 brought more stability 
toward the group's membership. The decree formally grants the rights to the members 
to hold and manage the land for 35 years, which make it almost impossible to formally 
replace a member since it has to go through protracted and complicated procedures.  
Only two cases of membership change were found after the decree was issued, 
and they occurred for another reason, being old and no longer unable to manage the 
land. In these two cases, the group decided that in one case, the land was transferred 
to a willing offspring of the formal member, and in another to a new member who is 
willing to pay for ganti rugi (remuneration). They also agree that the plots cannot be 
sold, and if the ganti rugi can be seen as selling, it certainly cannot be sold to 
“outsiders,” which refers to someone who lives outside the village. This measure is 
done with no change made in the formal ‘on paper’ membership, and the other 
members have to agree on the inclusion of the new members on the ground that the 
new member is well known and seen as willing to be involved in collective works. The 
members can choose from a handful of candidates as the land has proven to bring 
lucrative gains. 
Along with the memberships, the decree also specifies the boundaries and sizes 
of the plots they are holding.  Since then, the land boundaries have achieved strong 
rights security to protect them from any other claims. There are a few cases when 
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certain people came, presented themselves as members of grazing companies 
working in the area in the past, and claimed to hold supposedly government-
sanctioned use rights to the land. The members-only need to respond by saying that 
they hold the HKm ministerial holders, and so far, it is always enough to send them 
away. In retrospect, one of the members said: “If they want us out, then first the 
minister would have to do so.” 
The land boundary, in actuality, was not immediately secure when the BPDAS 
program began. In the early stage of the cashew planting, the group experienced 
regular burning on the planted plots. The herders especially do the burning from 
around the village to stimulate the grass growth to improve pasture lands. This 
tradition regularly damages the newly planted trees. The herder would first search for 
suitable grazing spots with better grass potential and a relatively flat surface for easy 
access. Most of the HKm area in the two groups match these criteria. Upon finding the 
spot, they burn the remaining and drying grass at the end of the dry seasons and bring 
their livestock to the site when the grass is tall enough. The cashew trees were short 
enough to be partly invisible among the bushes and grass so that the herders could 
easily decide to burn the HKm plots. In an attempt to ward off the burning from the 
plots without provoking conflict with the herders, they needed a softer tactic. Here, 
the extension officer once again had to bend the rule by asking for a corn seed subsidy 
from the local agricultural office. Cultivating corn is illegal within a state forest area, 
and so it is reasonable that the agent needed to come repeatedly before the 
agricultural office granted them the seed. The group members then planted the seed 
at the edges of the HKm areas. It was a practice of “storytelling” in the broad sense of 
the word, a narrative that is understood and accepted by the local people that assert 
that the land has owners (Rose, 1994), and therefore can no longer be accessed by the 
herders, or any other claimants. The tactic successfully prevented further damage to 
the new cashew trees, and they only stopped planting the corn at the land edges when 
the trees were tall enough to be confused with undergrowth. After 2014, when the 
groups began to put their cattle in the HKm area, they gathered to administer another 
group rule for an annual contribution to building strong fences around the entire HKm 
area. With this, the narrative of land control becomes stronger and provides clearer 
area boundaries. 
One important note here is that most of the members are rural proletarians. 
Prior to the program that granted them rights to the HKm plots, they were involved in 
casual jobs with daily wages such as construction worker, motorbike transporter, 
public transport (pete-pete) driver, hired as patrol by the grazing company, or similar 
types of jobs. They need arable land. Conversely, those who opt to neglect their plots 
typically have other plots outside the HKm and only intend to become absentee 
landowners through practicing ‘ongko’, controlling the land without actually 
cultivating the plot themselves. In a way, the uncertain nature of the HKm 
management in its early serve to select participants, distinguish the landless from the 
landed farmers.   
5.2. The congruence between rules and local conditions  
The second principle concerns the congruence between the rules and local 
conditions. In this case, the internal group rules are acceptable to the members, 
including their suitability to the benefits gained and local norms. The case shows a 
handful of rules they developed and enforced internally, and in some instances, also 
affected non-group members. We have seen above several rules such as no absentee 
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members, no plot selling, annual contribution. In terms of annual contribution, the 
members decided in 2014 that they would pay IDR. 30,000 (approximately USD 2.5 in 
2014 rate) per individual cattle aging one-year-old or older, paid for at the end of each 
year. The agreement was made to fund the fence building and maintenance, provide 
additional fodder and water for the cow in the dry season. They also agreed to pay an 
undetermined amount of incidental contribution should an immediate need arise, 
such as mending a broken fence. On top of these payments, they agree to provide 
labor for collective work such as fence building and maintenance. 
They agreed to these rules and mechanisms because they are necessary to 
ensure the best possible production considering limited resources (such as grass 
fodder) and the ability to harvest the products. In total, they produce approximately 70 
tonnes of cashew nuts annually and keep around 160 cows from their plots. The small 
amount of annual contribution cannot be seen as unwillingness to contribute to the 
shared interest since they pay more money and labor to solve the unexpected issues. 
This arrangement represents two aspects. First is the dominance of unexpected 
problems they have to deal with financial cost (regular monitoring is covered with 
labor contributions). Second, it may also stem from their deep-seated tradition of 
contributing labor, money, and goods in celebratory events related to the life cycle or 
incidental occurrences.     
5.3. Participation of group members in making and modifying rules  
“Meetings are plenty,” said one member describing the early stages of each 
project, whether the ones that come from the government or their own. Convening 
group meetings has become their norm. The meetings are held for larger projects such 
as building the fence, or those related to outside parties, like proposing and 
welcoming government projects or subsidies. On this last note, the meeting norm 
ensures that the group can distribute the government information and subsidies 
evenly. 
Besides the rules established during formal group meetings, others are 
produced from their informal gatherings and follow local norms. For instance, since 
the cashew trees began to bear substantial fruits, they made it their duty to watch 
each other's plots. During their evening outings, this rule agreed upon to hunt for wild 
chicken, after which they would consume the catch together while talking and 
sometimes spend the night in the woods. This practice is a local norm, also applied 
when they look for prawns in the streams. On one of such nights, they talked about the 
issue of cashew nut theft a member has experienced. Since then, they would call the 
plot owner if they saw a stranger come to the owners' plot. They would ask whether 
the owner had sent some worker to harvest (the sizable harvest of cashew typically 
requires most group members to hire additional wage workers). The caller would ask 
the owner to come and see the perpetrator had the owner reveal that he/she never 
sent a harvester. This mechanism also applied when they began to graze cows within 
the HKm area (see below). 
The informal gatherings then are important occasions where the groups talk 
about shared issues. Cashew harvesting, for instance, provides opportunities for 
gathering in the HKm area while at times helping each other casually. It takes days to 
collect the fallen nuts, store them in sacks, and transport them to the main road. 
These agricultural-related gatherings accompanied and partly based on a tradition to 
conduct gatherings related to the life cycle, such as newborn (aqiqah), building and 
moving to a new house, wedding, and mourning the dead. The norm to hold gatherings 
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helps the groups improve participation, including the women, in formal meetings 
related to the group activities and issues and the groups' rules making and 
modification. For instance, they have repeatedly talked about raising the annual 
contribution put forward by a few prominent members of the groups. However, 
because it would be too much for some members, they decided to stick to the same 
amount they agreed to in 2014 while paying for incidental contributions. This 
indicates a relatively equal relationship among the members, which helps to ensure 
equal participation. 
The informal gathering also serves as an effective domain to identify issues 
brought up by members since the casual events provide a relaxed mood where 
everybody is comfortable enough to talk about their issues. Informal gatherings 
strengthen the bonds among members while preventing the creation of social 
distance, which can help in participation. During an FGD with the groups’ members, it 
was clear that the women in the group showed little hesitation in voicing their 
opinion.   
5.4. The groups rules are acknowledged and respected by the higher authorities 
The group rules and rulemaking are acknowledged and respected by formal 
authorities outside of the group. There has never been a case where the government 
agents come and modify or annul group's rules. The ministerial decree granted to the 
group plays a vital role in this respect. The group has become a formal group 
acknowledged by the local and national state agencies, receiving more attention, 
including becoming a target for subsidies and other state services. They have received, 
for instance, aids in kinds such as seeds, agricultural tools, and equipment which 
includes 400 cashew nutshell crushers. 
Their remarkable achievement as groups relative to other HKm groups in the 
area, mainly for their success in producing sizable harvest and collective management 
of the plots and cows, spotlighted them in the social forestry circle. Amidst pessimistic 
reports on implementing social forestry (Moeliono et al., 2017; Sahide et al., 2020), 
they become success stories. Visiting high forestry officials, forestry agencies, and 
social forestry groups from other provinces regularly come to Mattirotasi to learn 
about their recipes and achievements. Invitations to national events organized by 
forestry agencies also regularly sent the group representatives to talk about their 
achievements. 
Lastly, the inclusion of the extension agent as one of the group members also 
serves an essential role in the acknowledgment.  The extension worker has a better 
position to access contacts and information on programs, subsidies, and formal rules 
surrounding social forestry management. He can inform the whole group about 
changing and/or establishing traditional rules during the group's rule-making 
processes. This privilege enables them to work around and even bend the established 
formal rules that do not provoke adverse responses from government agencies.       
5.5. Develop own monitoring systems  
As mentioned above, the groups have developed systems to monitor the 
enforcement of the rules. They observe each other's plots and cows from theft, they 
watch for intrusion from non-members who try to lay claim on a certain plot. They 
assign members to ensure the financial contribution is paid on time and managed 
well. Many of these mechanisms are based on their long tradition of watching each 
other’s property, such as land, plant, and cattle. They are incrementally crafted and 
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enacted as group mechanisms upon experiencing a case of shared concern. An 
example is the case of a missing cow. A member noticed one evening that a cow was 
missing. He called other members, who immediately gathered and decided to block off 
all possible roads for the thief to take the cow out of the area. After waiting all night 
and realizing that the cow should have never been brought out of their plots, they 
decided to search the cow inside their perimeter and found the cow. 
After the incident, the group members went to the field more frequently during 
the nights, and the same incident never recurred. One member said: “any potential 
thief will think twice to snatch our cows, since they think we are always on watch in 
the woods, for 24 hours, that we spend all night there, even when nobody is actually in 
the forest.” In addition, they are ready to block off any possible escape routes for the 
cow thieves. 
In general, as the members practice the mutual help norms, most of their 
monitoring mechanisms are applied to outsiders who try to take away their harvest or 
property. Since the monitoring mechanisms are based on local norms, they are not 
written on paper and spread through casual word of mouth. Violations done by 
members are usually unintended and are resolved through collective action, which we 
will turn to in the next section. 
5.6. Graduated sanction to rule violations  
Graduated and affordable sanctions developed incrementally through case-by-
case events, enforced through collective action, and avoided adopting sanctions 
involving outside mechanisms such as financial fines or incarceration. This principle 
can be seen in cases where wandering cows have damaged the crops, and both the 
cows and crops owners are group members. In these cases, the victim will never ask 
for a financial settlement or other formal type sanctions. Instead, the available group 
members will work together to repair and improve the fence so that the accident will 
never be repeated. When asked why they avoid financial settlement, a female member 
said, “You may never get anyone to help you when you stand by the road with sacks 
you cannot carry and need to go back home.” Or something of similar nature. They see 
financial punishment as a cheap move and that their relations and history (and 
potential) of mutual help are too valuable to lose by applying financial fines. A similar 
type of dispute settlement was found among ranchers in the case of people in Sahsa 
County, California, US (Ellickson, 1991). 
Where the adopted (formal) sanction was applied or threatened to be applied, it 
was done toward non-members. A case in point is when a member’s cows damaged a 
cultivated plot owned by a non-member who was a fellow villager. It was settled with 
financial payments, following the rule that the groups had agreed on. The group 
mediated the violation (the cow owner had failed to take care of his wandering cattle) 
and paid for the approximate cost of the damaged crops. However, the victim feels a 
mental burden after receiving the fine. Once, probably pushed by his burden, he asked 
the cow owners, “I have not seen you smile at me for a long time,” to which the cow 
owner replies jokingly while smiling, “Why you are always in your car, and the road is 
dusty. All the dust would fill up my mouth if I smiled at you.”  As the norm of non-
financial punishment upheld by the entire village, non-member villagers feel they 
should have chosen another kind of settlement. 
The only cases where the adopted formal sanction was actually applied were 
related to the basic formal ties between the members and the group: their 
memberships. They were the cases where members were expelled from the group for 
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violating the obligation to cultivate their granted plots after six months of controlling 
the land. This represents the end of formal relations between the members with the 
group. The rule was adopted to achieve formal requirements, namely, the distributed 
lands are planted with mpts, and therefore, it seems legitimate to punish the violators 
with related formal sanctions. 
Another type of sanction involves the magical power of one plot owner that can 
render the thief to get lost in the seemingly open plots. The FGD participants recount a 
story where a cashew thief circled around in confusion within a plot all through the 
night in search of a way out until the owner finally came in the morning and freed him 
from the spell. The information about the incident, which is unfamiliar, quickly spread 
and seems to prevent similar violations effectively. This case represents another 
rationality as to why the people should avoid such violations.  
5.7. Affordable conflict resolution.  
As described in the previous section, the group mostly resolved disputes among 
members by avoiding financial compensations, and the group committee would 
mediate disputes between members and non-members. There has never been a case 
where the disagreement is so out of hand that they need an outside party to negotiate 
and settle the case for them. However, in the case of non-member violations, the 
threat of involvement of security forces is enough to resolve any potential dispute. For 
instance, a former member tried to reclaim the plot he held before his expulsion from 
the group for failing to cultivate the land. When the extension agent, who is also a 
member, heard the report, he came to meet him and said: “I heard that you have come 
to weed the land twice already. If you come once again, it will be the police who take 
you away!” This conversation was enough to stop him from attempting to reclaim the 
land. The agent-member explained that the man was his close relative, but “he had 
violated our rule in the past, and the punishment is permanent because we have 
redistributed the plot to another member.”   
5.8. Nested enterprise.  
The group and the corresponding plots are established formally through social 
forestry scheme programming. This formal grant marks the inclusion of both the 
members and the land into a more extensive social forestry system in Indonesia. As 
such, the group receives more attention and subsidies. They are also invited to 
national events and host study tours to disseminate their success stories to other 
social forestry farmer groups. These involvements represent different levels of 
responsibilities for various parties, i.e., the group's commitment is to manage the 
granted land, and the state agency is responsible for supporting them and 
disseminating their success to other similar groups. 
Along with their current high profile among the social forestry circle, the formal 
state grants are also critical to the protection of the commons, especially to face more 
powerful claimants, some are more powerful than the members. The ministerial 
decree is a formidable document to send away any potential claimants, thus 
convincing the group members to continue their activities on the granted plots. The 
inclusion of the extension worker in the group as a member, which is now formally 
allowed across the nation, provides additional leverage with better access to formal 
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6.  DISCUSSION: COMMONING THE STATE FOREST 
The formal social forestry schemes are part of the result of ongoing international 
and national advocacy on land access and community-based resource management. 
The state land distribution programs developed and persisted so far can be seen as 
part of the result of the national and international agrarian reform, Indigenous, and 
environmental social movement (Fisher et al., 2019; Lee Peluso et al., 2008; Moeliono 
et al., 2017; Sahide et al., 2020). Therefore, the local commons can also be 
understood as part of the national and global systems (Chikozho & Mapedza, 2017; 
Saunders, 2014). Notably, the program was able to open the space to local practice 
commoning and therefore crafting commons. From collectively protecting their young 
cashew trees, they use the experience to manage collective cow range, and currently 
cashew nuts processing and selling. 
However, while these findings might be tempting for us to see “the bright side” 
of the public services and governance (Douglas et al., 2021), the state programs have 
to negotiate and be molded by local actors and conditions in order to be successful (Li, 
1999). Indeed, the failure of 12 other HKm groups is locally attributed to the enclosure 
by the dominance of tree timber in their plot and that the group members have other 
lands to till outside the village. The early stage of the social forestry trial project 
focused more on forest rehabilitation than access to the people who depend on them. 
The high modernist conservation plan came with 70% timber trees and 30% mpts 
devoid of local conditions, thus creating a failed scheme (Scott, 1999). 
The success of the other two HKm groups lies in the relatively open space for 
power struggle for the people to mold and bend the scheme to their ends (Gaventa, 
2006). The enclosure did not succeed on the entire Hkm area in Mattirotasi only 
because the groups, with the help of an extension worker, bent the rules and 
continued their activities by practicing commoning, and therefore creating a 
commons. Since then, they have been incrementally crafting institutions by combining 
adopted rules and maintaining relevant norms. The commons then successfully 
provide sustainable benefits to the members, producing steady income mainly from 
the cashew nuts and cows. Specifically, this success depends on several interrelated 
factors: the state protection, economic incentive, practice of commoning through 
‘institutional bricolages’ (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015), and inclusion of the extension 
worker as a cultural interpreter and information bridge. 
The state looms over the area, and a formal document in ministerial decree for 
HKm grants represents the ultimate state protection. Without this document, multiple 
actors would lay claims on parts of the HKm area as in the past. Prior to the HKm 
projects and program, multiple land tenure was present in Mattirotasi. The traditional 
practice of claiming land cultivated by one's ancestor who first cleared the plot, 
sharecropping, or land deals developed after the inheritance, and modern formal 
Cultivation Right granted for business (HGU) was intersected and sometimes 
intersected overlap in the state forest in Mattirotasi. These practices were effectively 
ended at the beginning of the BPDAS program in 2002, and the members' land use 
rights became even stronger at the issue of the ministerial decree 2012.  Therefore, 
the state has served a profound function to secure the current land tenure from 
different parties that come from time to time with varied claims (Ryan 2013). 
From the outset, the potential economic benefit from becoming a HKm member 
is critical to stimulate their self-organization for collective action (Seixas & Davy, 
2007). The uncertain future of the HKm grants during the early stage serves to select 
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participants, to distinguish the landless from the landed farmers.  Most of the aspiring 
members were rural proletarians involved in casual jobs with daily wages. Then, the 
former members who chose to neglect their plots are landed farmers who have other 
plots outside the HKm and only intend to become absentee landowners, practicing a 
traditional land tenure of ‘ongko’, namely controlling the land without actually 
cultivating the plot. 
The practice of commoning in Mattirotasi has been so far able to protect, 
preserve and create new commons. Out of the subsequent needs to protect the entire 
plots of the two HKm groups, the members began to craft rules collectively by 
combining new formal rules and mechanisms with traditional ones. They administer 
the group rule that obliges the members to weed and plant their plots to select 
landless landowners and set annual contributions for building and maintaining 
fences. Meanwhile, the traditional practices of collective works offer a multitude of 
opportunities to meet and talk about shared issues, which among others, create 
monitoring mechanisms and ensure participation. The values such as helping each 
other in agricultural and life cycle-related activities help uphold informal sanctions 
such as non-financial settlements. They even preserve the longstanding rationalities 
such as belief in magical powers as a monitoring tool. Through gossip, word of mouth, 
the information travels to the whole village and beyond, forging a shared knowledge 
of the groups' magic power and collective watch effectively preventing trespassers. In 
this way, they fulfill the dimensions of commoning social practices: co-produce 
institutional bricolage (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015; Jones, 2015) in the form of local 
services to face several constraints, contributes voluntarily to satisfy shared needs, 
create self-governing institutions where members directly affecting each decision 
making (Euler, 2018; Fournier, 2013). When needed, they also bend the formal rules, 
such as planting corn to surround and protect their young cashew trees, a practice 
that is facilitated and tactically protected by the inclusion of an extension worker in 
their group. 
Nevertheless, the extension worker serves so much more than just helping to 
bend the formal rules. He is deeply tied to and understands the local socio-cultural 
and political-economic contexts. He originated from a nearby village and has many 
close relatives in Mattirotasi. Moreover, as a regency state employee, he has contacts 
beyond the villages and sits in a position that enables him to provide important 
information and network needed by the group. Therefore, he can process the group 
aspirations and demands and craft them as suitable proposals to relevant state 
agencies at different levels and present them in the moments and manner that 
considers complex bureaucratic red tapes, loopholes, and opportunities.  
7. CONCLUSION 
The case shows that the state has provided necessary and basic programs and 
rules for creating the local commons in Mattirotasi. Meaning that the local commons 
cannot persist without the state's powerful protection of the current tenure and 
continued support. Conversely, the state policies would fail to create commons 
without commoning practices involving collective governance that combines different 
rules and rationality and even at times bending the rules to achieve shared goals. 
Here, it is essential to note that the inclusion of a cultural mediator or interpreter in 
the extension worker provides a crucial bridge, channeling aspirations, information, 
programs, and goods between the state and the commoners. 
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This interdependence can be better understood by tracking back to the 
beginning when the commons was created instead of only focusing on how commons 
evolve and persist. Design principles have enabled us to dive into necessary elements 
that define a commons and its success or failure. However, standing alone, the 
principles may only represent a portrait of the commons at the research time. 
Moreover, exploring how local norms and values interact with formal rules and 
interests resulted in a clearer picture of how the commons incrementally crafted, 
preserved, and created new commons. Here, aside from the extension worker who 
serves as a channel, the commons success depends on the solid economic incentives, 
relatively autonomic space for commoning, and institutional bricolage play essential 
roles. 
Focusing on the practice of commoning, we found that varied types of 
institutions, interests, and rationalities meet to cooperate or be involved in conflict 
with each other at different moments. Contingently, various alliances of actors or 
convergence of interests may change. The national political climate, for instance, may 
suppress demands for access to land and open an opportunity for new claimants to 
exclude the HKm groups out of their granted lands. Similarly, some prominent 
members may develop stronger connections to local political elites and use the newly 
acquired power to privatize parts of the commons and start the process of 
decommoning from below. In fact, this might provide the question for future research, 
what happens when there is a change related to community forestry policies, if power 
balance changes occur in the national and local level, how would they change the 
decision-making processes in the group? Another critical issue may come from below: 
what happens to the excluded non-members within and around the village? Seeing the 
steady stream of lucrative income flow from the forest, do they just stay put? 
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